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There are at least two critical decisions that every police officer must
make, sometimes daily. The first is the decision to approach a citizen with an
investigative or adversarial purpose in mind. This decision may be predicated
upon the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the civilian is up to some mis-
chief. Perhaps the situation is more cut-and-dry; the officer has found prob-
able cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime. In the most
extreme case, the officer has come upon a crime in progress, and is con-
fronted with an offender who is attempting to escape. As detailed below, each
of these scenarios has a set of conditions that the officer must meet to satisfy
strictures laid out in the Bill of Rights, particularly the Fourth Amendment.
The second and less common decision for the officer is whether the behav-
ior of a suspect calls for the application of any force, and if so, how much.
The suspect, in turn, must choose to cooperate or resist. Patently, intentions
and motivations propel most contact between police and suspects.
The predicament is not that intentions and motivations exist or play a role
in the outcome of the exchange—the problem is the subjectivity of inten-
tions/motivations and the difficulty of knowing what is in someone else’s
mind. A hindsight analysis of events usually raises a wealth of speculation
about motives, intentions, and “what if” questions. Such questions were at
the heart of the substantive due process review in suits against police officers
who were judged to be “malicious and sadistic.”1 In Graham v. Connor the
Rehnquist Court solved the subjectivity problem by jettisoning the substan-
tive due process standard when either the Fourth or Eighth Amendment might
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North Carolina – Chapel Hill; Ph.D., 2000, UNC-CH; J.D., 2013, North Carolina Central University.
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1.See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2nd Cir.1973).
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instead apply.2 The Court described their revised standard of review as an
inquiry guided by “objective reasonableness.”3
A final and critical step in the analysis of use of force is to decide if the
officer acted properly under color of his or her legal authority, or whether the
officer’s actions violate established statutory or constitutional rights. Assum-
ing arguendo that the officer acted within certain bounds, he or she will enjoy
protection from lawsuit under the aegis of “qualified immunity.”4
This article aims to trace the legal issues that arise across the arc of police-
civilian interactions. Specifically excepted from this discussion are encoun-
ters that occur post-arrest, including events that may occur in interrogation
rooms and corrections facilities. The focus here is the process by which an
officer engages a civilian, before or during an arrest, and the consequences
of an officer’s use-of-force. To adumbrate a conclusion of this review, legal
precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis have steered police accountability
to an effective dead end.5 Even in the most extreme cases of unwarranted
force, the deck is unreasonably stacked in favor of law enforcement.
Sometimes hindsight is the only lens that gives a complete account of rap-
idly evolving events, and the “reasonable police officer” guideline is itself
subject to the biases and priorities of the judge and/or jury.6 It may be appro-
priate now—28 years after Graham met Connor—to revisit the question of
reasonable use of force by government agents and the standard of review in
these cases. Specifically, it is proposed that the standard of “objective rea-
sonableness” is neither: it has become too narrowly construed to be truly ob-
jective, unreasonably constraining the context of what is to be judged, and
leading to outcomes that do not protect the rights of citizens. Fourth Amend-
ment restrictions on unreasonable search and seizure should invoke a pre-
sumption that a government actor who attacks a person or takes a life without
substantial justification has violated that citizen’s constitutional protections.
2. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (U.S. 1989).
3. Id. at 397.
4. See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam). See also Kit Kinports, The Su-
preme Court ’ s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 62, 67-68 (2016)
(discussing the impact of Mullenix on the line of cases invoking “qualified immunity”).
5. See, e.g., Nancy C. Marcus, From Edward to Eric Garner and Beyond: The Importance of
Constitutional Limitations on Lethal Use of Force in Police Reform 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y
53 (2016) (Discussing a series of “notorious” police killing of Black civilians, the impact of police train-
ing, and describing current efforts at police reform).
6. See, e.g., Vida B. Johnson Bias in Blue: Instructing Jurors to Consider the Testimony of Police
Officer Witnesses with Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 245 (2017) (describing juror biases regarding police
testimony).
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I. BACKGROUND – THE ROAD TO OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS
A. REASONABLE SUSPICION AND TEMPORARY DETENTION
To accord with the Fourth Amendment and the standard set in Terry v.
Ohio, a police officer must have, at minimum, a “reasonable suspicion” of
criminal activity to stop a suspect for questioning.7 To temporarily hold a
person for further investigation, the officer must be able to articulate a reason
for suspecting pending criminal conduct based on the circumstances and con-
text of immediate events.8 It cannot be a mere hunch or speculation.9 In other
words, at the very first moment of contact between a civilian and a law en-
forcement officer, the question of “reasonableness” is based on what the of-
ficer may infer from events.10 That is, considering his or her experience and
training, did the officer reasonably perceive that there might be some crime
afoot?
Sometimes there is a second step in the reasonable suspicion inquiry–-does
there exist sufficient cause to search a person so detained? Once again, the
guidelines of Terry require the officer to have a “reasonable suspicion” that
the suspect is armed.11 The search must be a limited search for weapons, that
is, a frisk or pat down of the outer clothing.12
The key word here is “reasonable.”Was the search or seizure reasonable?
This short instruction—that searches and seizures must be reasonable—is the
basis for many of the rules of procedure faced by police, prosecutors and
courts in criminal cases.13 This Fourth Amendment requirement has probably
generated more legal ink than any other constitutional issue before the crim-
inal court.
In the instance where no reasonable suspicion exists to engage in a search
of a person or property, the determined officer need not necessarily be de-
terred. Voluntary consent of a person in authority to search of the premises
7. Terry v, Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. (“And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant
that intrusion.”).
11. Id. at 26.
12. Id. (The author has heard officers testify that they patted down the suspect “for officer safety.”
Officer safety is the reason for the guideline, but it is not the standard. The standard is an articulable
suspicion, based on the facts and circumstances at the scene, in the light of the knowledge and training of
a reasonable police officer, that the suspect has a weapon.).
13. See generally W.R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT (5th Ed., 2012) (providing a discussion of search and seizure law in two volumes).
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is acceptable under the Fourth Amendment.14 There is no requirement that
the officer advise the party of his or her right to refuse to consent, and the
only condition is that the predicate detention of the suspect is lawful.15
Thus, the very first line of inquiry in the exploration of an excessive force
claim is often an inquiry into what was going on in the police officer’s mind
in the moment of contact with a suspect.16 What did he or she imagine, and
why? Note that even if the officer’s suspicion was not founded, it is sufficient
that the suspicion was reasonable.17
B. PROBABLE CAUSE AND ARREST
Many adversarial contacts are based on the officer having some reason to
believe (beyond a reasonable suspicion) that a crime has been committed.
That is, the officer has probable cause to believe that a crime has occurred,
and that the suspect is the likely offender.18 Like “reasonableness,” “probable
cause” is a specific requirement of the Fourth Amendment – “the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and noWarrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”19
A notable difference between probable cause and reasonable suspicion is
that probable cause does not limit the assessment to that of a “reasonable
police officer.” Probable cause expands the requirement. For probable cause
to exist, there must be sufficient facts and evidence to warrant any person of
reasonable caution to believe that a crime is happening.20 A badge alone is
not enough. Nevertheless, an observant officer will often find probable cause
in the most minor of infractions–-a broken tail light, perhaps, or overly tinted
windows on the suspect’s vehicle.
As circumstances move up the continuum from reasonable suspicion to
probable cause, a law enforcement officer’s authority expands, while the sus-
pect’s options shrink. An officer may briefly detain a suspect based on rea-
sonable suspicion, but it takes probable cause to justify an arrest (regardless
14. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n. 22 (“A search to which an individual consents meets
Fourth Amendment requirements.”).
15. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 US 218, 227 (1973).
16. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
17. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 US 119, 126 (2000).
18. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (“Probable cause exists where ‘the facts
and circumstances within their [the arresting officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trust-
worthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’
an offense has been or is being committed.”).
19. U.S. CONST., amend. IV (italics added).
20. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162.
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of how minor the infraction).21 Arrest, in turn, usually justifies a complete
search of the person and his or her immediate surroundings.22
C. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The origins of due process may be traced to language referencing the “law
of the land” in the Magna Carta.23 The concept of “substantive” due process
was originally applied to property law, on the question of where a person
could be deprived of property by legislation, or if the matter required judicial
action.24 More recently, substantive due process is credited with being the
basis for Connecticut v. Griswold25 and various cases that followed, identi-
fying a “right to privacy” where no such right is described in the Constitu-
tion.26
As a result, due process review has been criticized as a means of legislating
from the bench. In 1930, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote, “As the de-
cisions now stand, I see hardly any limit but the sky to the invalidating of
those rights if they happen to strike a majority of this Court as for any reason
undesirable.”27 Other critics of the idea include Justices Byron White, Anton
Scalia and Clarence Thomas.28 Noted legal scholar John Hart Ely described
substantive due process (perhaps incorrectly) as an oxymoron: “[W]e appar-
ently need periodic reminding that ‘substantive due process’ is a contradic-
tion in terms - sort of like ‘green pastel redness.’”29 Some hold that substan-
tive due process is redundant; that due process is due process, regardless of
how the term is modified.30 McCormack argues to the contrary that proce-
dural and substantive due process were distinguished from one another as a
result of New Deal policies.31 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky says that proce-
dural due process is a question of whether the government has followed
21. Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 322-23 (2001) (“The question is whether the Fourth
Amendment forbids a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt
violation punishable only by a fine. We hold that it does not.”).
22. See generally Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (discussing the permissible scope
of search pursuant to an arrest).
23. James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive
Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 320 (1999).
24. Id. at 328-29.
25. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
26. Daniel O. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 IND. L. REV. 215, 219
(1987).
27. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930).
28. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 432 U.S. 494, 543 (1977), (White, J., dissenting); U.S. v.
Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1994), (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, C., concurring).
29. JOHNHART ELY, DEMOCRACY ANDDISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIALREVIEW 18 (1980).
30. Jamal Greene, The Meming of Substantive Due Process 31 CONST. COMMENT. 253, 253 (2016)
(“Substantive due process is not a contradiction in terms. Indeed, it is redundant.” (footnote omitted)).
31. Wayne McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Process and the Right to Livelihood, 82 KY.
L.J. 397, 404 (1993-1994) (“No recognized distinction between procedural and substantive due process
existed until after the New Deal eliminated the substantive protections.”).
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proper procedures, while substantive due process is an inquiry into whether
there is “sufficient substantive justification” for some governmental action.32
One frequently cited criminal case to employ a substantive due process
analysis was a 1952 case, Rochin v. California.33 In Rochin, California offic-
ers illegally pumped a suspect’s stomach, searching for drugs.34 In the pre-
Warren 1950s, the law in California and many other states allowed the ad-
mission of physical evidence even when it had been illegally obtained by the
police.35 Ergo, in Rochin the Fourth Amendment was not in play, and the
Supreme Court resorted to substantive due process to interfere in a question
of police conduct that otherwise would have been acceptable to the state:
This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the pri-
vacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was
there, the forcible extraction of his stomach’s contents—this course of pro-
ceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even
hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the rack and the screw
to permit of constitutional differentiation.36
In 1973, Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on
Johnson v. Glick.37 He concluded that the assault of a pre-trial detainee by a
corrections officer fell under neither the Fourth Amendment (because it was
not a search or seizure) nor the Eighth Amendment (because it was an unpro-
voked assault, and given that the victimwas being held pre-trial, not intended
as a “punishment”).38 Accordingly, Friendly decided that the case most
closely fit the situation where “application of undue force by law enforce-
ment officers deprives a suspect of liberty without due process of law.”39
Friendly cited the “shocks the conscience” test from Rochin in support of his
analysis.40 Judge Friendly devised a 4-factor test (including malicious and
sadistic motivation) as the measure for excessive force.41 This became the
32. Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501 (1999).
33. Rochin v. California,342 U.S. 165 (1952).
34. Id. at 166.
35. People v. Rochin, 101 Cal.2d 140, 142; 225 P.2d 1, 2 (1950), rev ’ d sub nom. Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (“[T]he accepted rule in this state, as in many others, permits the introduction of
improperly obtained evidence on the ground that the illegality of the search and seizure does not affect
the admissibility of the evidence.” (quoting People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal.2d 165, 169, 124 P.2d 44 (1942))).
36. 342 U.S. at 172.
37. 481 F.2d 1028 (1973).
38. Id. at 1032.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1033 (quoting Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172).
41. Id.
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prevailing standard for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Action for Dep-
rivation of Rights).42 It was this substantive due process standard for review-
ing excessive force claims that was curtailed by the Supreme Court in Ten-
nessee v. Garner43 and rejected outright in Graham v. Conner.44
D. THE FLEEING FELON RULE
Sometimes the first contact between an officer and a citizen is when the
crime is in progress (or complete) and the officer perceives that the perpetra-
tor is attempting to flee the scene, or, alternatively, an arrestee is trying to
escape. In the past, the common law governed police use of force in such
situations: the ”fleeing felon rule” permitted the use of force, including
deadly force, against an individual who was suspected of a felony and was in
clear flight.45Over time, this rule from English Common Law filtered its way
into the Tennessee and other state criminal statutes.46
In Tennessee v. Garner, the father of a young man shot by a Memphis
police officer filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.47 Edward Garner was a 15-
year-old eighth-grade student48 when he broke into an unoccupied home and
stole a ring and $10.49 He was confronted in the back yard by Officer Elton
Hymon:
With the aid of a flashlight, Hymon was able to see Garner’s face and hands.
He saw no sign of a weapon, and, though not certain, was “reasonably sure”
and “figured” that Garner was unarmed. He thought Garner was 17 or 18
years old and about 5’ 5” or 5’ 7” tall. While Garner was crouched at the
base of the fence, Hymon called out “police, halt” and took a few steps
toward him. Garner then began to climb over the fence. Convinced that, if
Garner made it over the fence, he would elude capture, Hymon shot him.50
Hymon’s shot struck Garner in the back of the head; he died shortly later
in a hospital operating room.51 The U.S. District Court found no constitu-
tional violation in either the statute or Hymon’s actions.52 The Sixth Circuit
42. 490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989).
43. See 471 U.S. 1 (1985), see also Heath v. Henning, 854 F.2d 6 (1988), (holding that the District
Court improperly instructed a jury as to the legal standard in a use-of-deadly-force case.).
44. 490 U.S. 386-87.
45. 471 U.S. at 12-15.
46. Id. at 12.
47. Id. at 5.
48. Id. at 4 n.2.
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id. at 3-4 (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 4.
52. Id. at 6.
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Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed.53 The State then appealed the mat-
ter to the Supreme Court.54
The Supreme Court sided with the Court of Appeals, saying that deadly
force was justified only when the fleeing suspect had already inflicted or was
likely to cause serious bodily harm to the officers or others.55 In Tennessee v.
Garner the Supreme Court began its shift from a Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process approach to one based on a Fourth Amendment
standard of review.56 The resulting analysis offers a “totality of the circum-
stances” perspective:
To determine the constitutionality of a seizure “[w]e must balance the na-
ture and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment in-
terests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to jus-
tify the intrusion.” We have described “the balancing of competing inter-
ests” as “the key principle of the Fourth Amendment.” Because one of the
factors is the extent of the intrusion, it is plain that reasonableness depends
on not only when a seizure is made, but also how it is carried out.57
Although the Garner decision clarified the issue of when police may em-
ploy deadly force, based on a “totality of the circumstances” test, it did not
address the use of less-than-deadly force. That question was the problem the
Court confronted in Graham v. Connor.58
E. OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS
Dethorne Graham was a diabetic.59 On November 12, 1989, Graham real-
ized that he was having an insulin reaction, and that he required sugar to
prevent hypoglycemia (low blood sugar).60
Graham asked his friend William Berry to drive him to a convenience store
so he could buy some orange juice to counteract the reaction.61 Upon arriving at
the store, Graham quickly entered and found several people waiting in line. Con-
cerned about the likely delay, Graham hurried from the store and asked Berry to
take him to a friend’s house.62OfficerM. S. Connor of the Charlotte, North Car-
olina police department was parked in the store parking lot. He observedGraham
running into and from the store and proceeded to follow Graham and Berry as
53. Id.
54. Id. at 7.
55. Id. at 11.
56. Id. at 7 (“[T]here can be no question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure
subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”).
57. Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
58. See 490 U.S. 386.
59. 490 U.S. at 388.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 388-389.
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they drove away.63A short distance from the store, Connor stopped Graham and
Berry.
Berry explained to Officer Connor that Graham was having a “sugar reac-
tion” and Connor told the two that they would have to wait until Connor
found out what had happened at the store.64 According to Graham’s trial tes-
timony, this was the last thing he remembered until he woke up on the ground
surrounded by police officers.65
Connor went to his car to call for backup. While he was doing so, Graham
got out of Berry’s car, ran around it twice, then sat on the curb and briefly
passed out.66 Several Charlotte officers responded to Connor’s call.67 They
handcuffed Graham tightly, ignored Berry’s pleas to get him some sugar and
lifted Graham to the hood of Berry’s car. Officers seemed to believe Graham
was intoxicated.68When Graham asked the officers to look in his wallet for
a decal identifying him as a diabetic, they told him to “shut up” and forced
his face down against the hood of car.69 They then threw Graham headfirst
into a police car and refused to let him drink the orange juice that a friend
brought to the scene.70 After Connor was assured that nothing had happened
at the convenience store, the police drove Graham home and released him.71
Graham suffered a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, an injured shoulder, a
bruised forehead, and he reported ongoing trouble with ringing in his right
ear.72 Graham sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.73 The case made its way to the
Supreme Court, which sided with Graham and ruled that the lower courts had
applied the wrong standard of review.74
The Supreme Court determined that the standard of review in this case and
cases like it–-including many police-involved shootings of civilians-–should
be limited to review for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.75 They
63. Id. at 389 (“The officer became suspicious that something was amiss and followed Berry’s
car.”).
64. Id.
65. Graham v. City of Charlotte, 827 F.2d 945, 947 (4th Cir. 1987), rev ’ d sub nom. Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
66. 490 U.S. at 389.
67. Id.
68. Id. (“Another officer said: ‘I’ve seen a lot of people with sugar diabetes that never acted like




72. Id. at 390.
73. Id.
74. See Graham v. City of Charlotte, 827 F.2d at 945, 950 (holding that substantive due process is
the appropriate standard of review).
75. 490 U.S. at 395 (“Today we make explicit what was implicit in Garner’s analysis, and hold
that all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force— deadly or not— in the course
9
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did not stop at merely requiring all seizures, particularly, the forcible seizure
of people to be reasonable. The Court also was concerned about the judgment
calls made by officers in making use-of-force decisions. They said:
The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20
vision of hindsight. . .With respect to a claim of excessive force, the
same standard of reasonableness at the moment applies: “Not every
push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of
a judge’s chambers,” violates the Fourth Amendment. The calculus
of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police of-
ficers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circum-
stances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the
amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.76
The Court went on to describe the inquiry as one of “objective reasonable-
ness.”77 Specifically, the officers’ actions should be objectively reasonable
in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, and “without regard
to the officers’ underlying intent or motivation.”78 The Court disagreed with
the Court of Appeals requirement that police be subjectively motivated to act
in a “malicious and sadistic”manner.79 That is, the question of whether there
was some malicious intent on the part of the officer is irrelevant to the Fourth
Amendment analysis.80 The question is, did the officer reasonably respond,
based on objective facts and circumstances at the time, with the appropriate
level of force?81 In view of his instructions to Graham and Graham’s seem-
ingly erratic and irrational actions, did Connor and his fellow officers react
appropriately?
We know now that Graham was sick, not drunk. We know now that Gra-
ham likely did not intentionally ignore Connor’s instructions or resist the po-
lice. We know now that the force used against Graham was unnecessary-–if
the officers knew then what we know now. That hindsight knowledge is the
trap that the objective reasonableness standard seeks to avoid.82
of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other “seizure” of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment and its “reasonableness” standard . . . .”).
76. Id. at 396-97 (citation omitted).
77. Id. at 397.
78. Id. (italics added).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 393-94 (“We reject this notion that all excessive force claims brought under § 1983 are
governed by a single generic standard. . . In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983,
analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged ap-
plication of force.”).
81. Id. at 394.
82. Id. at 396.
10
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In his concurrence in the Graham case, Justice Blackmun (joined by Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall) agreed that in general, a Fourth Amendment
analysis of the sort described above was the appropriate course in most police
use-of-force cases.83 Blackmun expressed concern that the Court had taken
the additional step of foreclosing any other analysis.84 Particularly, Blackmun
saw “no reason for the Court to find it necessary further to reach out to decide
that prearrest excessive force claims are to be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment rather than under a substantive due process stand-
ard.”85 Blackmun said that use of force “not demonstrably unreasonable un-
der the Fourth Amendment only rarely will raise substantive due process con-
cerns.”86 In other words, Blackmun was suggesting that police use of force
may give rise to a substantive due process claim even when no constitutional
violation exists, and that he would prefer to rule on a case in which that ques-
tion was “squarely raised.”87
F. WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Regardless of an officer’s erroneous judgment—that is, when a constitu-
tional violation is found to exist-–in most situations law enforcement officers
may lay claim to “qualified immunity.” According to Justice Scalia, “Quali-
fied immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable
but mistaken judgments about open legal questions. When properly applied,
it protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.”88 The limitations are outlined inMullenix:
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so
long as their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or con-
stitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” A
clearly established right is one that is “sufficiently clear that every reasona-
ble official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”
“We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must
have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” “Put
simply, qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.”89
Saucier v. Katz raised the matter of whether qualified immunity and con-
stitutional violation issues merge into a single question, because they both
83. Id. at 399 (Blackmun, H., concurring).
84. Id. (The Court did acknowledge that the officer’s ill will toward a suspect might play a role in
assessing the officer’s credibility, and that an officer’s “good faith” in the reasonableness of his or her
actions might be relevant to the question of qualified immunity.).
85. Id. at 399-400.
86. Id. at 400.
87. Id.
88. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (citation omitted).
89. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. at 305, 308 (citations omitted).
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require evaluating the objective reasonableness of the officer’s conduct.90 In
determining that the two are separate questions, the Court pointed to the pos-
sibility that the officer might not know how a legal doctrine would apply to
the present factual situation.91 In other words, even when a clearly established
law is violated, a reasonable officer who could have believed that his or her
conduct was lawful is still entitled to qualified immunity.
In sum, justifying the forcible and sometimes fatal seizure of a person min-
imally requires 1) an objectively reasonable use of force by the officer (often
based upon a very time-limited analysis of events, and in consideration of the
officer’s training and experience), and/or 2) that the officer is not plainly in-
competent or criminal, and reasonably believed that his or her conduct was
lawful.
II. OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS RECONSIDERED
Objective reasonableness is a kind of “mens rea-free zone,” in that it does
not matter what the officer has in mind so long as his/her behavior is “rea-
sonable.”92 That may sound fine, except that almost any behavior can be
made to seem reasonable when the review narrows to judgements made hast-
ily, under stress, in the exigency of the moment. We are not far from where
matters stood 70 years ago:
It is a principle very generally accepted that an officer, having the right to
arrest an offender, may use such force as is necessary to effect his purpose,
and to a great extent he is made the judge of the degree of force that may
be properly exerted. Called on to deal with violators of the law, and not
infrequently to act in the presence of conditions importing serious menace,
his conduct in such circumstances is not to be harshly judged ...[H]e may
use the force necessary to overcome resistance and to the extent of taking
life . . . 93
Law enforcement officers are trained to anticipate danger in every situa-
tion, and drilled to respond almost mechanically to any apparently lethal
threat.94 Nearly any movement by a suspect may be construed as potentially
90. Saucier v. Katz et al.,533 U.S. 194, 199-200 (2001).
91. Id. at 205 (“The qualified immunity inquiry, on the other hand, has a further dimension. The
concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal
constraints on particular police conduct. It is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the rel-
evant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts. An
officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but have a mistaken understanding as to whether
a particular amount of force is legal in those circumstances. If the officer’s mistake as to what the law
requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.”).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 74-80.
93. State v. Fain, 229 N.C. 644, 646, 50 S.E. 2d 904, 905 (1948) (italics added).
94. See generally Thomas Petrowski, Use-of-Force Policies and Training – A Reasoned Approach
(Part Two), 71 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 11, 24-32 (2002) (discussing threat assessment, the preemp-
tive use of reasonable force, reducing incidents of unreasonable force, and use of force policy).
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hazardous. For example, officers are instructed in careful detail that there is
a perception-reaction lag, wherein valuable time is lost recognizing and un-
derstanding the situation—sometimes to the extent of being in danger from a
person armed with a knife as much as 21 feet away.95 This perceptual lag is
also used to explain why suspects are sometimes shot in the side or back.96
Where police officers hesitate, it seems that criminals do not. It is a conven-
tion that:
[O]fficers can only accurately hit their moving assailants 14% of the time
in life-or-death situations from distances of only two to 10 feet. On the other
hand, assailants were able to successfully engage and hit officers 68% of
the time within those same distances.97
In other words, a motivated offender is more dangerous than an experi-
enced police officer. As a result, “officers must be trained to respond to the
threat of violence and not to the actual violence itself, guarding against the
inherent presence of hesitation.”98 Even a fleeing suspect, pulling at his
waistband and construed to be reaching for an unseen weapon, may face
deadly force.99Moreover, police officers under the stress of the moment rou-
tinely experience perceptual distortions that likely impact on their judgment
of real or perceived danger.100
It is not surprising that police officers still repeat the mantra this author
learned in a state police academy 40 years ago: “Better to be tried by twelve
than carried by six.”101 Graham’ s apparent restrictions regarding hindsight
and “reasonableness in the moment,” 102 coupled with a training regime that
95. Marcus, supra note 5, at 85-88.
96. RonMartinelli, Revisiting the 21-foot-rule, POLICEMAGAZINE, (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.po-
licemag.com/channel/weapons/articles/2014/09/revisiting-the-21-foot-rule.aspx (“The reason why some
suspects are found to have entry wounds in their sides and backs when the officers who shot them say the
suspects were facing them when they fired is often the perception action-reaction lag time and the manner
in which information was processed by the officers’ brains. This is pretty sophisticated information for a
criminal or civil jury to understand and consider.”).
97. Id.
98. Petrowski, supra note 94, at 28.
99. See, e.g., Krueger v. Fuhr, 991 F.2d 435, 440 (8th Cir. 1993).
100. See David A. Klinger & Rod K. Brunson, Police officers ’ perceptual distortions during lethal
force situations: Informing the reasonableness standard, 8 CRIMINOLOGY & PUBLIC POLICY 117 (2009)
(discussing the likelihood of officers experiencing substantial levels of perceptual distortion during deadly
force encounters, suggesting that after-the-fact assessments must consider perceptual and sensory distor-
tions likely to occur when a reasonable officer becomes aware of a potential threat of death or serious
injury).
101. Christopher S. Wren, Official Ban Ignored: Police Carry Extra Guns Despite Department Ban,
N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1973, at 85 (“We have been told that if we get caught in the car with anything other
than a .38, we’ll have charges brought against us,” said one young patrolman from the 83d Precinct, which
covers the Bushwick section of Brooklyn. “But it’s better to be judged by 12 men than carried by six.
That’s the motto around here.”) available at https://www.barrypopik.com/index.php/new_york_city/en-
try/its_better_to_be_judged_by_twelve_than_to_be_carried_by_six_police_saying.
102. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
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predicts danger in the suspect’s every gesture, creates the perfect crucible for
police officers to respond violently now in expectation that their actions will
be deemed “reasonable” later.103
A. REASONABLENESS IN THE MOMENT
There are important implications in how the courts have construed “rea-
sonableness in the moment.”104 Even before Graham, there was no require-
ment for the police to use less intrusive measures, providing they acted rea-
sonably under to the Fourth Amendment.105 Courts have since held that ob-
jective reasonableness is focused on the very moment in which the use of
force is deemed necessary, regardless of otherwise “ill-advised” conduct on
the part of the police.106 This seems to be the case even when the police man-
ufacture the basis for the use of force.107 In sum, there is a set of cases that
focus sharply on the “reasonableness in the moment” reference in Graham,
with less attention to the “totality of the circumstances” perspective en-
shrined in Garner, Connor and most Fourth Amendment analysis gener-
ally.108
In apparent response to this practice, the Ninth Circuit created a provoca-
tion rule, which makes an officer’s otherwise reasonable use of force unrea-
sonable if (1) the, “officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent con-
frontation’ and (2) “the provocation is an independent Fourth Amendment
violation.”109
This rule came into play when two deputies from the Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia, Sheriff’s Department were sent to search for a “potentially armed and
dangerous parolee-at-large” in the back of the property where the suspect had
103. See generally J. Michael McGuinness, Law Enforcement Use of Force: The Objective Reason-
ableness Standards under North Carolina and Federal Law, 24CAMPBELLL. REV. 201 (2002) (discussing
various cases and circumstances under which objective reasonableness applies, including “mistaken be-
lief” cases).
104. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
105. Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983) (reasonableness of governmental activity does
not turn on existence of alternative “less intrusive” means).
106. Schulz v. Long, 44 F.3d 643 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Cole, 993 F.2d at 1333) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures, not unreasonable or ill-advised conduct in general. Conse-
quently, we scrutinize only the seizure itself, not the events leading to the seizure, for reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment.” (citations omitted)).
107. Fraire v. Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting as irrelevant evidence
that police officer manufactured the circumstances which gave rise to the force).
108. See Kit Kinports, Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion: Totality Tests or Rigid
Rules? 163 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 75 (2014) citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (“Since its decision
more than thirty years ago in Illinois v. Gates, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Fourth Amend-
ment’s suspicion requirements— the probable cause required to arrest and search, the reasonable suspi-
cion needed to stop and frisk— are totality-of-the-circumstances tests.”).
109. See L.A. Cnty. v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017) (citing Billington v. Smith, 292 F. 3d
1177, 1189 (C.A.9 2002).
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allegedly been sighted.110 They located a shack which was home to Mendez
and Garcia, who were inside asleep. Without knocking or identifying them-
selves, the deputies opened the door.111 Mendez was holding a BB gun that
he kept nearby to kill pests.112Deputy Conley yelled “Gun!” and both officers
opened fire.113 Both Mendez and Garcia were hit; Mendez lost a leg.114 Both
survived. No parolee was found in the shack or on the property.115
This case presented an opportunity for the Supreme Court to settle the
question of how narrowly in time courts should look to determine questions
of excessive force-–in the moment that force is used, or at the “totality of the
circumstances?”116 In the opinion authored by Judge Alito, the phrase “in the
moment” was never mentioned. Instead—and perhaps in the interest of una-
nimity—the Court passed on that specific question.117 They rejected the prov-
ocation rule as an “unwarranted and illogical extension of Graham,” and ac-
cepted “the principle that plaintiffs can—subject to qualified immunity—
generally recover damages that are proximately caused by any Fourth
Amendment violation.”118
A “totality of the circumstances” analysis necessarily begins when the of-
ficer and the suspect first interact. On what basis did the two come together?
It is in these few early seconds that many use-of-force episodes begin. Ob-
jective reasonableness crosses paths with subjective intentions and motiva-
tions in the instant that the contact occurs. There are many circumstances
under which an officer may initiate contact, including:
1. The officer has no adversarial expectation or intent (e.g., a “courtesy
contact” to inform the person of some problem or hazard.)
2. The officer has a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe
crime is afoot.




114. Id. at 1545
115. Id. at 1542
116. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae, National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo-
ple et al., L.A. Cnty. v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017) (No. 16-369) (discussing the “totality of the
circumstances” analysis, the disproportionate killing of people of color by police, and split-second judg-
ments regarding use of deadly force).
117. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1547 n. (“Respondents do not attempt to defend the provocation rule.
Instead, they argue that the judgment below should be affirmed under Graham itself. Graham commands
that an officer’s use of force be assessed for reasonableness under the ‘totality of the circumstances.’ On
respondents’ view, that means taking into account unreasonable police conduct prior to the use of force
that foreseeably created the need to use it. We did not grant certiorari on that question, and the decision
below did not address it. Accordingly, we decline to address it here.” (citations omitted)).
118. Id. (“All we hold today is that once a use of force is deemed reasonable under Graham, it may
not be found unreasonable by reference to some separate constitutional violation.”).
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3. The officer approaches a person with a suspicion that does not rise
to the level of “reasonable,” or is mistaken.
4. The officer has issued a command (lawful or not) to which the person
is slow to respond, or fails to respond.
5. The officer intrudes (lawfully or not) into the privacy of a person’s
place or house.
6. The officer’s confrontation of the person is based on some extra-le-
gal variable (age, race, gender, etc.)
A Fourth Amendment violation at this moment of contact—an unreasona-
ble suspicion, an unlawful act or command, an unwarranted search or sei-
zure—those mistakes alone are not necessarily enough to pierce the protec-
tions granted to police officers in performance of their duties.119 In Mendez,
the Court of Appeals determined that the L.A. deputies were protected by
qualified immunity for failure to knock-and-announce at the Mendez’s door,
despite their lack of a warrant.120 But what if the approaching officer is pro-
vocative, the tone is hostile, the demeanor is threatening or violent? Surely
these are facts and circumstances to be considered in evaluating an excessive
force outcome. As psychologist James Fyfe observed:
Discussions of police violence are often blurred by the failure to distinguish
between violence that is clearly extralegal and abusive and violence that is
simply the necessary result of police incompetence. This distinction is im-
portant because the causes of these two types of violence, and the motiva-
tions of the officers involved, vary greatly. Extralegal violence involves the
willful and wrongful use of force by officers who knowing exceed the
bounds of their office. Unnecessary violence occurs when well-meaning of-
ficers prove incapable of dealing with the situations they encounter without
needless or too hasty resort to force.121
B. WRONG, ROGUE, OR MERELY MISTAKEN?
No protection under “objective reasonableness” seems to exist for civilians
faced with officers who turn violent or behave dangerously under the color
of law. Perhaps no better example of this is the case of Jeronimo Yanez, a
Ramsey, Minnesota police officer who shot and killed Philando Castile on
camera, in front Castile’s girlfriend and her daughter.122 The shooting oc-
curred after Castile volunteered that he had a gun in his possession, for which
119. See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015).
120. Mendez v. Cnty. of L.A., 815 F.3d 1178, 1191-1193 (9th Cir. 2016), see also L.A. Cnty. v. Men-
dez, 137 S. Ct. at 1549.
121. James Fyfe, The Split-Second Syndrome and Other Determinants of Police Violence, in
CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 517, 517 (Roger G. Dunham & Geoffrey P.
Alpert eds., 7th ed. 2015).
122. Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile, N.Y. TIMES (June 16,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/police-shooting-trial-philando-castile.html.
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he had a lawful concealed-carry permit.123 According to a report prepared for
the prosecutor by use-of-force expert Jeffrey Noble, “The totality of the facts
and circumstances indicate that Officer Yanez’s use of deadly force was un-
necessary, objectively unreasonable, and inconsistent with generally ac-
cepted police practices.”124 In a rare turn of events, Yanez was charged with
criminal manslaughter and two counts of endangering the other occupants in
the car.125 He was acquitted of these crimes at trial.126
Perhaps the critical fact in the Yanez case is that although he claimed that
he stopped Castile based on Castile’s similarity with a suspect in a bank rob-
bery, “no reasonable police officer would have believed that Mr. Castile
matched the description of an armed robbery suspect.”127 Officer Yanez did
not treat the stop as an officer might when confronting an armed criminal,
and instead “conducted a routine car stop due to a faulty brake light and ap-
proached the driver’s door of Mr. Castile’s vehicle with his handgun hol-
stered.”128 While the Castile case will not have its day in civil court,129 it is
not difficult to imagine that Yanez himself might have enjoyed qualified im-
munity, because (1) Yanez was not plainly incompetent or criminal (witness
his acquittal in criminal court); and (2) Castile was armed.130
Mistakes of fact and law figure importantly in use of force cases. A partic-
ularly disturbing trend has officers confusing their own handguns for
tasers.131 The predictable response is that it was an “honest”mistake. The fact
that a law enforcement officer has an honest belief that he or she is acting in
accord with the Constitution and state law can mean that the target is now
fair game.132Although some states (such as North Carolina and NewMexico)
specifically disavow a “good faith” exception to their statutory exclusionary
123. Id.
124. Jeffrey J. Noble, Expert Report of Jeffrey J. Noble 5, Ramsey County Attorney’s Office, Yanez
Case Trial Documents, https://www.ramseycounty.us/sites/default/files/County%20Attorney/No-
ble%20Use%20of%20Force%20Final%20Report.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2017).
125. Smith, supra note 122.
126. Id.
127. Noble, supra note 124, at 45-46.
128. Id. at 4.
129. Mark Berman,Minnesota Officer Who Killed Philando Castile Formally Leaves Police Depart-
ment, Given $48,500 Buyout, WASH. POST (July 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2017/07/11/minnesota-officer-who-killed-philando-castile-formally-leaves-police-depart-
ment/?utm_term=.a7ed047d6d12 (“The agreement with Yanez comes not long after Castile’s fam-
ily reached a $3 million settlement with St. Anthony, which avoids a federal civil rights lawsuit his rela-
tives had pledged to file.”).
130. Smith, supra note 122.
131. E.g., People v. Mehserle, 206 Cal.App.4th 1125, 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 423 (2012); Henry v. Purnell,
652 F.3d 524 (2011); Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F. 3d 1119 (2011).
132. See Heien v. North Carolina, No. 13-604, 574 U.S. ___, 1 (2014) (citing Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U. S. 160, 176 (1949)) (internal citations omitted) (The 8-1 majority held that a police officer’s
reasonable mistake of law can provide individualized suspicion to justify a traffic stop).
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rules, the Supreme Court disagrees: “The Fourth Amendment requires gov-
ernment officials to act reasonably, not perfectly, and gives those officials
‘fair leeway for enforcing the law.’ Searches and seizures based on mistakes
of fact may be reasonable. The limiting factor is that ‘the mistakes must be
those of reasonable men.’”133
Although it is not a use-of-force case, Heien v. North Carolina raises this
issue of “mistake” and its consequences.134 In Heien, an officer’s honest but
apparently incorrect understanding of the traffic statutes (mistake of law)
provided him with the excuse he needed to (1) seize the occupants of the
vehicle, (2) extract inconsistent and suspicious statements from the parties,
and (3) engage in a consent search of the vehicle, finding contraband.135 The
Supreme Court adjudged that the North Carolina officer had acted reasona-
bly.136
Acts based on honest but mistaken beliefs are particularly egregious when
an officer finds evidence to support a lawful arrest, or to justify the use of
force. The tendency is to apply a kind of post hoc rationale: the belief must
have been correct, because evidence/contraband/weaponry was found.137 The
fact is, as was the case in Heien, officers routinely target persons they deem
suspicious but not rising to the level of “reasonable suspicion” and monitor
or follow the suspect until some reasonable suspicion/probable cause
emerges—as it almost inevitably will.138
C. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: NOT DEAD YET
Even though police use of force may be “objectively reasonable” at some
point, it is often the mere decision to make contact, and the method of that
contact, that sets the stage for eventual struggle. This raises the substantive
due process question: what is the “sufficient substantive justification” for
some governmental action, as contemplated by Professor Chemerinsky?139
What is it about the situation that caused the police to act in the first instance,
before the fight broke out?
There is no question that reckless, dangerous conduct on the part of the
civilian can justify deadly force from the police. In Scott v. Harris the police
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2.
136. Id. at 12-13.
137. Id. at 12 (“. . . Heien is not appealing a brake-light ticket; he is appealing a cocaine-trafficking
conviction as to which there is no asserted mistake of fact or law.”).
138. Id. at 2 (“Shortly before 8 a.m., a Ford Escort passed by. Darisse thought the driver looked ‘very
stiff and nervous,’ so he pulled onto the interstate and began following the Escort. A few miles down the
road, the Escort braked as it approached a slower vehicle, but only the left brake light came on. Noting
the faulty right brake light, Darisse activated his vehicle’s lights and pulled the Escort over.”).
139. Chemerinsky, supra note 32.
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caused severe, permanent disability to a driver who was attempting to elude
the officers at high speed.140 The Supreme Court ruled 8-1 that this was an
appropriate application of deadly force, justified by the danger Harris pre-
sented to officers and others.141
In Sacramento v. Lewis, a factually similar case to Harris, the officers pur-
suing a fleeing motorcycle on which Lewis was a passenger were unable to
stop in time when the bike fell over and Lewis was killed when struck by
their police car.142 The Court held that Lewis was not seized pursuant to the
Fourth Amendment when the accident occurred, and that a substantive due
process review was appropriate.143 According to the opinion of Justice
Souter, “[A] purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest
will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience, nec-
essary for a due process violation.”144 In other words, evidence of “a purpose
to cause harm” prior to a seizure may give rise to a substantive due process
violation.
Substantive due process and its “conduct that shocks the conscience”
standard may not protect a suspect—usually a young man—from confronta-
tion with an eager officer or two as they provide the impetus for a resisting
arrest charge. But what if a purpose to cause harm arises because the suspect
has resisted? The American Law Institute proposes “proportionality” in the
use of force:
[P]roportionality means that even when force is the minimum necessary
force to achieve a law-enforcement end, its use may be impermissible if the
harm it would cause is disproportionate to the end that officers seek to
achieve. The proportionality principle demands that law-enforcement inter-
ests go unserved if achieving them would impose undue harm.145
What of the instance where at least six (eventually more) officers are pre-
sent while one of them chokes a man to death as he repeatedly complains that
he can’t breathe, in public and on film?146 Is overwhelming force the objec-
tively reasonable response to resistance by an unarmed civilian? Advertent
or not, surely deadly force is an extreme reaction to the crime of selling loose,
untaxed cigarettes.147
140. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
141. Id.
142. City of Sacrament v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 837 (1998).
143. Id. at 833.
144. Id. at 836.
145. Barry Friedman et al., Proportional Use of Force, THE ALI ADVISOR, (March 23, 2017),
http://www.thealiadviser.org/policing/proportional-use-force/.
146. Al Baker, J. David Goodman, & Benjamin Mueller, Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric
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A discussion of the pros and cons of “broken window policing” is beyond
the scope of this review. What is squarely within its purview is the question
of when resistance to an arrest for some petty violation will justify fatal use
of force. “The necessity inquiry is a factual one: ‘Did a reasonable non-
deadly alternative exist for apprehending the suspect?’”148
In terms of potential for resistance, there is no reliable difference between
arresting someone for a broken taillight and for suspicion of murder.149 Ac-
cordingly, there are times when a police officer’s best course of action may
be to issue a warning, or write a citation, or simply walk away and if appro-
priate, apply for a warrant. To force the moment to its crisis in the zeal to
make an arrest may be not be reasonably justified and, practically speaking,
simply unnecessary—sometimes shockingly so.
CONCLUSION
The United States is a dangerous place, and being a police officer here is
a dangerous job.150 It is unsurprising that for people who rightly or wrongly
draw police attention, being approached by an officer likewise portends dan-
ger.151 The time for the police to hesitate is not when they are in the middle
of an encounter. The time for them to hesitate is before the encounter occurs.
Consideration of the purpose and aims of the interaction and the desired out-
come weighed against the likelihood of confrontation should figure in their
thinking. To their credit, some police agencies now offer training in implicit
bias, de-escalation techniques, and other policies aimed at making police
“guardians” instead of “warriors.”152
The “totality of the circumstances test” as discussed in Garner and refer-
enced in Graham draws specific attention to the severity of the crime and the
likely threat the suspect presents.153 A narrow focus on the moment of force
148. Forrett v. Richardson, 112 F. 3d 416, 420 (citing Brower v. County of Inyo, 884 F.2d 1316, 1318
(9th Cir.1989)).
149. But cf. John Kavanagh, The Occurrence of Resisting Arrest in Arrest Encounters: A Study of
Police-Citizen Violence, 22 CRIM. JUST. REV. 1, 16 (May 1, 1997) (discussing the role of citizen and police
attitudes in a review of resisting-arrest events).
150. See Lisa Desjardins, The History of U.S. Police Deaths in the Line of Duty (PBS Newshour
television broadcast July 8, 2016) https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/the-history-of-u-s-police-deaths-
in-the-line-of-duty.
151. See Jamila’s Lartey, By the Numbers: U.S. Police Kill More in Days Than Other Countries Do
in Years, THEGUARDIAN (June 9, 2015) https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/09/the-counted-
police-killings-us-vs-other-countries.
152. See “THE MARSHALL PROJECT” , De-escalation Training: A Curated Collection of Links,
https://www.themarshallproject.org/records/1220-de-escalation-training.
153. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (“Because ‘[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment
is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,’ however, its proper application requires
careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime
at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether
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is a misreading of Graham and a failure of the “totality of the circumstances”
review. Where is the “balancing of competing interests” between the individ-
ual’s rights and government aims?154What happened to the requirement that
reasonableness depends on both when and how a seizure is made?155 There
must be a determination that the force employed was justified by a legitimate
state interest in protecting the rights of all its citizens—including the person
against whom force was used.156
Justice Blackmun noted that reasonable use of force under a Fourth
Amendment analysis rarely will raise substantive due process concerns.157
The corollary is equally true-–Fourth Amendment violations are often bound
together with substantive due process abuses. Because they so often go hand
in hand, the first question in a use-of-force inquiry should be the substantive
justification for the encounter.
Objective evidence of an officer’s vindictive, hostile, or positive conduct
(as distinguished from “intentions and motivations”) prior to, during or after
any use of force should be identified as a legitimate part of a “totality of the
circumstances” Fourth Amendment analysis.158 Things an officer said and
did to preserve the peace and to protect all involved reflect his or her behav-
ior, not “intentions and motivations.” Those who object by reference to Gra-
ham’ s prohibition against hindsight misread the text.159 All reviews of past
events require hindsight. It seems obvious that the Rehnquist Court was ref-
erencing hindsight that considers facts not available to the police in the mo-
ment when force was judged necessary-–such as the fact that Graham was
sick and not intoxicated. This is easily distinguished from police who vio-
lated departmental policy by employing a dangerous and discredited choke
hold on a person suspected of a tax law offense.160
It is axiomatic that the Bill of Rights is meant to be a restraint on govern-
mental interference with individual freedoms. Clearly, a narrow reading of
“objective reasonableness” has twisted the Fourth Amendment definition of
he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”(citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
559 (1979)).
154. Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-9 (“[T]he question was whether the totality of the circumstances justified
a particular sort of search or seizure”).
155. Id.at 8.
156. 490 U.S. at 394 (“Where . . . the excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or inves-
tigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the
Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right ‘to be secure in their persons . . . against unrea-
sonable. . . seizures’ of the person.”).
157. Id.at 399-400 (Blackmun, H., concurring).
158. Id. at 399 (“Of course, in assessing the credibility of an officer’s account of the circumstances
that prompted the use of force, a factfinder may consider, along with other factors, evidence that the officer
may have harbored ill-will toward the citizen.”).
159. Id. at 396.
160. See Baker et al., supra note 146.
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“reasonable” into something that severely limits the ability of citizens to seek
redress for official misconduct. The time has come to return to a more en-
compassing understanding of “totality of the circumstances.” The investiga-
tion should review the sufficiency of the government’s justification to act,
and include precipitating behavior by government agents as–-at least-–one
variable in the analysis.
Did the suspect pose a threat that necessitated his or her seizure? Was the
force employed proportional to the presumed offense and surrounding cir-
cumstances? Did the officer(s) act in accordance with their own depart-
mental regulations? Qualified immunity requires that officers facing exces-
sive force allegations know when they are violating “clearly established stat-
utory or constitutional rights.”161 Objective reasonableness should require
law enforcement officers to know when they are violating clearly established
department policy.
It is not in the cause of justice or public interest to hamstring the police or
to make their job unreasonably difficult. The rule of law requires enforce-
ment. Police in the U.S. have drifted for some time in the direction of greater
latitude in their use-of-force decisions, presumably encouraged by the appar-
ently meager number of successful excessive force claimants162 and by a pub-
lic that believes strongly in “law and order.”While law-and-order may be the
go-to phrase for a politician seeking applause, it is the duty of the courts to
protect the minority view. The minority view, in this instance, is that law-
and-order does not trump the right to be free from state-sponsored harass-
ment, unwarranted police violence and plainly indefensible use of deadly
force.
161. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308.
162. See Kimberly Kindy & Kimbriell Kelly, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, WASH. POST, (Apr.
11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-few-prose-
cuted/?utm_term=.597ef5c6f285. See also PUB. L. 103–322, TITLE XXI, §210402, SEPT. 13, 1994, 108
STAT. 2071, (declaring that the U.S. Attorney General “shall, through appropriate means, acquire data
about the use of excessive force by law enforcement officers.” No such data exists.).
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